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ESCHEATS, ABANDONED PROPERTY ACTS,
AND THEIR REVENUE ASPECTS
By RAY H. GARIisoN*
A majority of states either have constitutional provisiems
or statutes providing for the transfer of unclaimed property to
the state after the lapse of a period of time. Such provisions
are of two types: (a) those providing for escheat or transfer
with title, and (b) those providing for transfer of possession
only (not title), subject to repossession at any time. Each type,
however, is a minor source of non-tax revenue.
SI
ESCHEATS
Present day statutes providing for disposition of unclaimed
property to a certain extent rest on the development of the legal
concept of escheats during the feudal period. A true escheat,
under the English usage of the term, was inseparably connected
with feudal tenures. Under their conception of property, free-
holders held estates from intermediate or "mesne" lords; the
crown held "paramount title." Death of the tenant without
heirs left no one to render the lord service for which the grant
of land was conditioned. As a consequence, the land was re-
turned to the lord. As "mesne" lords became uncommon, land
reverted directly to the king, who was "lord paramount." The
reversion to the original grantor upon disruption of tenure was
termed an "escheat." This form of escheat has been discon-
tinued in most of the British colonies, and was abolished in Eng-
land in the 19 2 0's.1
Landholders convicted of high treason forfeited their land
to the crown, as representative of the injured state. The king's
claim, Lowever, rested on his sovereign capacity rather than any
* M.A., University of Kentucky. Research Assistant, Federation
of Tax Administrators, Chicago; student, University of Chicago Law
School. Formerly employed as Fiscal Analyst for the Kentucky De-
partment of Revenue; Supervisor of Escheats in Kentucky at the
time the original administration of the present abandoned property
act was commenced.
Law of Property Act of 1922 and Administration of Estates Act
of 1925. Also see Williams, The Abolition of Escheat (1930)
69 LAw JOURNAL 369-370, 385-86.
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concept of feudal tenure. 2 On the other hand, land held by a
person attained for felony or petit treason returned to "mesne"
lords as eseheats, since these crimes were believed to stain the
convict's blood so as to blot out its inheritable qualities.3 The
crown's claim to forfeiture was distinct from the taking by
escheat, although the king was recipient of forfeitures as well
as "lord paramount." The operation of attainder for felony
became very limited, and was entirely abolished in 1870.4
Eseheats based on feudal tenures were confined to real
property. Personalty passed to the crown under the doctrine of
Bona vacantia; i.e. the crown's claim on behalf of society was
more expedient and equitable than that of a stranger.5 With
the abolition in 1925 of escheat based on feudal tenures the crown
became entitled to realty as bona vacantia.
Under other circumstances the crown took property as
"escheat", but actually the taking was by royal prerogative.
For example, an alien might acquire land but by law could not
hold it. Upon acquisition the King became entitled to any land
which aliens acquired. The King's forcible acquisition of the
land was not founded on feudal tenures. It was a policy of law6
and was in the nature of a forfeiture.7 The king's seizure of the
lands of Normans after the separation of Normandy from Eng-
land has been referred to as an escheat.8 However, the Terrae
Normannarum seems to be more of a forfeiture than escheat.
Escheat based on feudal tenures never existed widely in
this country except during the pre-Revolutionary period in the
colony of North Carolina 9 and the proprietary colonies.' 0  After
McDowell v. Berger, 12 Ir. Law Rep. N.S. 391; HAWKINS, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN, Book 2, Ch. 49, sec. 9; 2 INST. 64.
' SCRIVEN, COPYHOLDS (4th ed.) 631, suggests that attainder for
felony was a forfeiture rather than an escheat. However, as the
lord took by extinction of tenures, his taking for "corruption" of
blood has the characteristics of escheat.
'54 Geo. III 145; Felony Act of 1870 (33 and 34 Vict. 23), pro-
vided for the appointment of an administrator to dispose of convict's
property.
I HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed.), 495-496;
Dyke v. Walford, 5 Moo. P.C.C. 434 (1846); Middleton v. Spicer, 1
Brown Ch. 201 (1783).
A. G. v. Duplessis, 2 Ves. 287.
'KENT, COMm. 61; Read v. Read, 5 Call. (Va.) 160.
Repararee's Case, 2 INST. 64.
'Bassett, Landholding in North Carolina, 11 LAW QUARTERLY RE-
VIEW, 154-155.
" FISiE, CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1890) 150-155.
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the Revolution, the feudal position of "paramount lord" passed
to the state with the other sovereign's rights." Attainder for
felony and treason existed in some of the American colonies but
has been abolished. The statutes or constitutions of most states
provide that no conviction of crime shall work forfeiture of
estate or corruption of blood.'
2 -
The doctrine of escheats in the American states soon out-
grew its restricted meaning under the English landholding
system. Today it is considered to be more of an incident of
sovereignty than of tenure. Title to land passes to the state
upon a defect of heirs as an attribute of sovereignty because
ultimate title to land rests in the state, just as "paramount
title" to all land was held by the king under the English land
tenure system. Under the exercise of the states' police powers
personal property is taken by the states just as the English took
personalty under the theory of bona vacantia.1' By escheat the
state does not take property as last heir but because there is no
ascertainable heir.'
4
All states provide for the escheat of property upon the
death of an owner without a will and lawful heirs. Numerous
other statutory provisions under which the states take property
are provided. These are primarily for the purpose of enabling
the state to follow up and take property for which there is no
apparent owner. It is thought that the general interest of
society requires that property shall not remain abandoned with-
out someone representing it, and without an owner legally capa-
ble of alienating it.15 Among the bases for the states' acquisi-
tion of such property, loosely called escheats, are: (a) failure to
claim a legacy; (b) actual abandonment of property; (c) pre-
' In a number of states tenures are abolished by specific con-
stitutional provision, statute or judicial decision.
" STIMSON, Am. ST. LAW, secs. 143, 1162; see also Art. III, sec. 3,
U.S. CONST., and Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 36 L. ed. 812 (1892).
' Cf. Commonwealth v. Blanton's Executors, 41 Ky. (T.B. Mon.)
393, at 399 (1842).
' State v. Lancaster, 119 Tenn. 638, 105 S.W. 858 (1907). The
German Civil Code, however, advances the theory that the state
takes property of decedents without known heirs as last heir. This
theory was incorporated in a proposal made in France a few years
ago under which the state would inherit a share as a natural heir.
Closely akin to this theory is that which prevailed in early Roman
law of allowing the first (i.e. the state now) to occupy the property
to become the lawful heir of the decedent.
" Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458 (1904).
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sumption of death without heirs after a period of absence; (d)
holding of property by a corporation, charitable, or religious
society in violation of law, such as property held in excess of
corporate needs or longer than a prescribed time, or for promot-
ing polygamy; (e) acquisition of public lands in excess of a pre-
scribed acreage; (f) inability to carry out the provisions of a
will for charitable purposes even though heirs exist; (g) dis-
solution of an educational institution with property: (h) pas-
sage by descent to alien heirs; and (i) recovery of ad valorem
property taxes paid the Federal government.
In addition, some states have enacted legislation designed
to take either a defeasible or an absolute title to such property
as: (a) dormant bank deposits; (b) unclaimed funds deposited
with utility companies to guarantee payment for service; (c)
money paid into court for distribution; (d) unclaimed dividends
interest, wages, etc.; (e) unclaimed corpus of trusts; and (f)
other dormant property. These statutes range from more or
less automatic divestiture of title without adjudication; i.e., an
ipso facto escheat, to those providing for a virtual trustee re-
lationship between the owner and state.1 However, several of
these ,enactments apply only to bank deposits. 1 7
IT
ABANDONED PROPERTY ACTS
Another legislative development has been devised for dis-
posing of unclaimed intangible property lying dormant for a
considerable period of time. This type of legislation does not
provide for escheat of such property, but instead permits the
state to take mere possession of the property for the benefit of
the owner. The state becomes the mere custodian of the property
which is presumed (not actually) abandoned due to its dormancy.
The state's interest is always subservient to that of the owner
should he (or his heirs or assigns) appear. The owner is not
deprived of any rights as creditor, pledgor, bailor, etc., and his
"' Public Administration Clearing House, Forgotten Funds Prove
State Bonanza (July 1, 1946) NEws BULLETIN, Release 1.
" Wisconsin Legislation Reference Library, State Laws as of
January 1, 1938 Providing for the Escheat of Certain Unclaimed
Money, March, 1938, 5 pp.; U.S. Library of Congress, Legislative
Reference Service, State Provisions Relative to Unclaimed Deposits
in Banking Institutions, May, 1942, 5 pp. (typed).
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right to demand the property from the state is always preserved.
The objective sought in laws giving the state possession of
property presumed abandoned is primarily to conserve prop-
erty for owners who have become disassociated with possession
and to protect it from risks attendant with long neglect. Funds
likely to be lost, through embezzlement, liquidation, bankruptcy,
long periods of inactivity, statutes of limitations, and death, are
given security. If the owner never appears, society enjoys the
benefit of the property.
Legislation providing for the disposition of property pre-
sumed abandoned has existed for several years. Such legislation,
however, developed rather slowly after its origin in the late
nineteenth century. Legislation of this type came into existence
after banking and the corporate type of business became highly
developed. Pennsylvania, in 1872, was the first state to require
the reporting and payment of bank deposits to the state due to
inactivity.ls The century had almost closed before the second,
Ohio, enacted similar legislation. 19 Mlassachusetts, in 1907, en-
acted a provision, still in effect, requiring savings banks to pay
over to the state as depositary unclaimed deposits.20  More than
a decade later Virginia enacted an abandoned property act '-"
which was repealed in 1928.22 A somewhat similar statute was
enacted in Rhode Island in 1907.23 California in 1915 provided
for the taking of a defeasible title to property presumed
abandoned. The title became absolute five years thereafter if
not claimed within that time.24 New York, in 1934, required
utility companies to pay to the state all unclaimed service re-
funds. 25 Other state legislatures which joined in the disposition
SP.L. 62, April 17, 1872.
OmO GEN. CODE, 9864-9887.
SMAss. St. 1907, Ch. 340, p. 292.
21 Virginia Acts, 1918, Ch. 252.
2 Virginia Acts, 1928, Ch. 484.
'Pub. Laws 1908, Ch. 1590, sec. 75.5, added by amendment by
Pub. Laws, Ch. 404.
-'State, 1915, pp. 107 and 1106.
'Effective June 1, 1944, New York required various classes of
property presumed abandoned to be transferred to the State
Comptroller for custody. These included: bank deposits; funds paid
into court; unclaimed money deposited for transmission to foreign
countries; unclaimed wages; matured endowments, paid-up life in-
surance, and death claims; unclaimed awards for property taken by
eminent domain; property of an inmate of an institution who died,
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of vArious types of unclaimed property included Michigan, 26
North Carolina,27 Oregon,28 and Tennessee.29 However, the
Ohio and Tennessee acts were of limited duration-the former,
after apparently little attempt was made at enforcement, being
held unconstitutional in 1931 by a lower court30 and the latter
repealed in 1941. 31
Pennsylvania, in 1937, enacted an additional requirement
that unclaimed dividends, cash surrender values and proceeds
of insurance policies, and certain debts be reported and turned
over to the Department of Revenue subject to reclaim.
32
Unclaimed bank deposits and funds held by building and loan
associations in Connecticut became subject to custody of the
state in 1941. 33 If the owner of the funds were known to be
living the Connecticut Act did not apply even though the funds
had long been dormant. Unclaimed funds in Minnesota were
required to be reported in 1943 so the attorney general might
institute suits to obtain custody thereof.34 At least 36 states
today have laws providing for transfer either of title or custody
to the state treasury of unclaimed personalty.
35
The early acts relating to property presumed abandoned
applied only to selective types of intangibles. The Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, and Virginia acts applied only to dormant bank
deposits whereas the Massachusetts and Rhode Island acts were
limited to savings accounts. The limited applicability of the
Rhode Island and Massachusetts acts was predicated on the as-
sumption that savings accounts, which are made in the expecta-
tion of remaining longer, are more likely to be forgotten and
abandoned. The amended Pennsylvania act reached but few
escaped, or was discharged and which remains unclaimed for six
months; and deposits held for payment of uncashed certified checks
or negotiable instruments. (CONSOLIDATED LAWS, N.Y. Ch. 1).
'"MicH. COMP. LAWS (Supp. 1940), secs. 13460, 13463 and Public
Acts of 1941, No. 170.
'N.C. Acts 1937, Ch. 400; N.C. Acts 1939, Ch. 29.
2 O.C.L.A., secs. 21-201, 40-1817.
'Tenn. Acts 1939, Ch. 161.
'State v. Cook, 41 Ohio App. 149, 180 N.E. 554 (1931).
" S.B. No. 58, Approved January 24, 1941. The act was repealed
largely because the national banks succeeded in exempting them-
selves (American National Bank of Nashville v. Clarke, 175 Tenn.
480, 35 S.W. (2d) 935 (1940).
"Pa. P.L. 2063, 27 P.S., secs. 434 et. seq.
CONN. GEN. STATS. (1941 Supp.) Ch. 209.
'LAWS OF IINN. (1943) Ch. 620.
"Public Administration Clearing House, op. cit., p. 1.
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additional types of property. The New York statute at first
was confined to utility accounts. Only under the Tennessee act,
which was repealed in 1941, were the various classes of intangi-
bles, such as corporate dividends, utility refunds, and bank de-
posits required to be paid over to the state after long inactivity.
The Kentucky legislature in 1940 and 1942 provided the
first simple comprehensive practical plan for the disposition of
most all kinds of unclaimed personal property.36 Actual ad-
ministration of the Kentucky plan, however, did not begin until
late 1944, pending the disposition of litigation involving the con-
stitutionality of the act.3 7 Four general classes of property are
required to be transferred to the Department of Revenue. These
include:
(1) Bank deposits payable on demand unless the
owner has, within 10 years, (a) negotiated in writing
with the bank; (b) been credited with interest on his pass
book at his request; (c) had a transaction involving the
deposit noted on the bank's books; or (d) increased or
decreased the amount of the deposit."
(2) Time bank deposits, unless the owner has within
25 years taken one or more of the actions enumerated for
demand deposits."9
(3) Funds such as utility service deposits and tele-
graph money orders and other property deposited to
secure the payment for, or performance of, services, and
the performance of covenants of indemnity."
(4) Intangible personalty such as "dividends, stocks,
bonds, money and credits ... held for the benefit of an-
other" by fiduciaries."
'Ky. Acts (1940) Ch. 79; Ky. Acts (1942) Ch. 156; Ky. R.S.
393.060 et. seq. The Kentucky General Assembly in 1938 (Ky. Acts
1938, Ch. 168) provided for the transfer of dormant bank deposits
and other forms of intangibles to the state Treasury, but no attempt
was made to enforce the statute. The 1938 act was expressly re-
pealed in 1940.
'Department of Revenue, Information Relating to Property
Presumed Abandoned and Escheats, circular SC-4, August 5, 1944.
News Release by Commissioner of Revenue W. J. Moore, August 5,
1944.
"KY.R.S. 393.060.
9 KY.R.S. 393.070.
40Ky.R.S. 393.080 and 393.100.
" KY.R.S. 393.090. The Department of Revenue (Regulation
SC-1, August 1, 1944) has never attempted to take under this section
dividends, paid-up life insurance values, awards for lands taken by
eminent domain, wages, pari-mutuel winnings etc., which are un-
claimed. However, see opinions of Assistant Attorney General
Earl Wilson of August 13, 1940 and August 26, 1940 holding this
section applicable to unclaimed dividends and the proceeds of life
insurance policies. In a general way only dry trusts, bailments and
pledges are covered under this section according to present rulings
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
Under the Kentucky scheme for administering property
presumed abandoned the holder, including national banks, is
required to file with the state a listing of such property. The
filing is done annually regardless of the fact no property is
being held which is presumed abandoned. Publication of the
listings is made in a paper of general circulation in the county,
4 2
and by posting the listing on the courthouse door.43 Upon fail-
ure by either the holder or owner to rebut the presumption of
abandonment before November 15 (following the reporting of
such property on September 1) by filing an affidavit with the
Commissioner of Revenue, the property is taken into protective
custody by the state. The holder is relieved of his liability to the
depositor or ownuer 44 who then has a claim against the state, n-
forceable at any time, until upon action initiated by the state, the
deposits are judicially found to be abandoned in fact.45 In the
absence of actual notice or appearance the claim right is extended
five years after judgment. 46 Administrative action in regard
to claims is reviewable in the state courts.
47
A few states require holders of unclaimed funds to publish
a list of the owners' names, if known, at periodic intervals, but
allow them to retain possession. For example, Colorado pro-
vides for publication every year of the names of owners of bank
deposits remaining unchanged for ten years.4s Banks in Rhode
Island are required to publish lists of inactive accounts once a
of the Department. (Department of Revenue, General Instructions
Relating to Escheats, circular SC-7, August 11, 1944; Regulation SC-1
August 4, 1944; and opinion of Attorney General, February 27, 1945).
Since ordinary debtor-creditor relationships are not required to be
reported because "the debtor is not holding property for the benefit
of any person," the Department excludes dividends and wages from
coverage by the statute. See In the Matter of Certain Moneys in the
Possession and Custody of the Harrisburg Bridge Co., 48 Dauph.
274 (1940) as to the taking of unclaimed dividends under the Penn-
sylvania abandoned property act (PA. P.L. 2063, PA. ACTS (1937) S.B.
No. 911) and Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Pt. I, N.Y. City (October 1, 1946), 15 LW 2219
as to applicability of New York abandoned property law to moneys
due on claims under policies issued by foreign life insurance com-
panies.
' The publication requirement was added by the legislature in
1944. (Ky. Acts (1944) S.B. 250).
KY.R.S. 393.110.
"KY.R.S. 393.130.
KY.R.S. 393.140.
Ibid.
4 KY.R.S. 393.160.
'9 COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) secs. 2-18-44.
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week for six successive weeks during every fifth year (no pub-
lication for accounts of $10 or less), and also to report such
dormant accounts to the Director of Business Regulation, who
incorporates the list in his annual report.49 Payment to the
state is not. required.
Various legal objections have been raised concerning both
the protective custody statutes and escheats as applied to per-
sonal property. The power of the state to enact such statutes
has been held to rest upon its right to provide for the care and
custody of property, the owners of which have not been heard
from for so long as to raise a presumption that it is abandoned. 5°
The custodial statutes, as distinguished from escheats raise dis-
tinctive legal questions as to the protection of due process.
Statutes requiring banks to pay over long unclaimed deposits to
the state as depositary generally have been held constitutional. 51
The principle as extended to utility deposits and other personal-
ty presumed abandoned likewise has been sustained.5 2 The state
takes custody or defeasible title to the property, without judicial
proceedings but safeguarding procedural due process. Judicial
proceedings must be had, however, before the property is con-
sidered actually abandoned.5
3
The safeguarding of procedural due process in the pro-
tective custody statutes does not require that every procedure
involving the transfer of the property be exclusively by judicial
proceedings, 54 just as decisions and orders of administrative
boards and commissions determine legal rights subject to sub-
sequent judicial review. The minimum essentials which must
exist in a statute providing for the taking of custody of prop-
'R.I. General Laws (1938) Ch. 135.
"Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 55
L. ed. 899 (1910).
'Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 64 S. Ct.
599 (1944); State v. Security Savings Bank, 263 U.S. 282, 68 L. ed.
301 (1923); Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S.
660, 55 L. ed. 899 (1910); State v. Northwestern National Bank of
Minneapolis,- Minn. , 18 N.W. (2d) 569 (1945); State v.
First National Bank of Portland, 61 Ore. 551, 123 Pac. 712 (1912);
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa.
138, 102 Ati. 569, 1 A.L.R. 1048 (1917).
'Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra note 51; Brooklyn
Borough Gas Company v. Bennett, 277 N.Y.S. 203 (1935).
13State v. Phoenix Savings Bank & Trust Co., 60 Ariz. 138, 132
Pac. (2d) 637 (1942).
" Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra note 51; Ballard v.
Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461 (1906).
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erty presumed abandoned in order that demands of due process
be fulfilled have never been positively stated. The state is not
required to institute legal proceedings before taking custody of
unclaimed property in order to have procedural due process. 5
*Wether posting of notice or publication is required in order
that due process be had cannot be stated definitely. 56 Where
the state takes custody only, -with the owner given the right
to reclaim the property at any time, the depreciation is so slight,
if any, the constitutional due process clause would seem not to
apply.57 Or, if applicable, the seizure of the property itself
provides notice to the owner that the state is being substituted
as obligor for the bank or holder.5s The statute itself is notice
to the depositor or owner that continued inactivity will possibly
subject his funds to transfer to the state.59
The administrative difficulties and expense, especially for
many small accounts of only a few cents, renders the publication
requirement a major factor of consideration in any statute at-
tempting to take custody of abandoned property. The Kentucky
statute requiring transfer of custody of dormant property to the
state originally made no provision for publication of notice in a
newspaper before taking control.60 Instead a posting of notice
on the courthouse door or bulletin board, an inexpensive sort
of notice but old and customary in Kentucky, is required. The
Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra note 51; cf. Samuels
v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 200, 69 L. ed. 568.
&3cf. Wilson, The Disposition of Dormant Bank Deposits and
Other Unclaimed Property (1943) 32 Ky. L.J. 41, wherein the case
law pertaining to abandoned property statutes prior to the AndersQn
National Bank case is considered.
"'Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Bennett, 277 N.Y.S. 203 at 219;
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138,
102 Atl. 569; State v. Security Savings Bank, 154 Pac. 1070 (Cal. App.
1915) 1 A.L.R. 1054 at 1056.
"Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra, note 51, at 245;
Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 318, 74 L. ed. 378 (1929)
where a statute providing for no notice other than seizure of the
bank deposit was held constitutional.
" Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, supra, note 51 at 243.
' The amendment requiring publication twice in a newspaper
in the county where the property was held was enacted after the
U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the sufficiency of the notice provided
in the original act. Under the Kentucky acts relating to banking
all banks had been required prior to the abandoned property act to
publish lists of dormant accounts annually (KY.R.S. 287.410). Thus,
the deposits taken in 1944 in Kentucky had been required to be ad-
vertised from 7 to 22 times, depending on whether demand or time
deposits, before the state secured custody.
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holder is required to voluntarily deliver the dormant property
to the state within six weeks after posting unless the owner has
rebutted the statutory presumption. In effect the statute merely
compels a summary substitution of the state for the original
holder. The owner may reclaim the property at any time (un-
less later escheated by judicial proceedings), and is guaranteed
a judicial determination of his rights upon refusal of his claim
for refund or if an action is instituted to compel surrender of
the property. The Kentucky Court of Appeals said the statute,
prior to the amendment requiring publication, was valid even
if posting on the courthouse door were not required. 6 '
On appeal from a ruling by the Kentucky Court, the U. S.
Supreme Court in the Anderson National Bank case stated :62
". .. the statute provides for notice to the depositors by re-
quiring the sheriff to post on courthouse door or bulletin board
a copy of the bank's report of deposits presumed abandoned.
We think this, in conjunction with the notice provided by the
statute itself and by the taking of possession of the bank balances
by the state, is sufficient notice to the depositors to satisfy all
requirements of due process."
The Court further states :63 "The fundamental requirement
of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice
and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which
the constitutional protection is invoked. If that is preserved,
the demands of due process are fulfilled, measured by this
standard, we cannot say that the present notice is insufficient."
The Aniderson National Bank case limited strictly to its fact
situation goes no further than to hold the Kentucky statute
which provided for posting of notice instead of publication, valid.
The validity of a statute requiring a voluntary transfer of mere
custody of dormant property upon notice provided by sequestra-
tion of the res, and constructive notice afforded by the statute,
is not determined. However, the case is particularly significant
because of its holding that the delivery to the state of dormant
bank accounts from a national bank does not infringe the nation-
al banking laws.
I Anderson National Bank v. Reeves, 293 Ky. 735, 170'S.W. (2d)
350 (1943).
Supra, n. 61, at 243.
Supra, n. 61, at 246.
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In First National Bank of San Jose v. California64 the
United States Supreme Court held invalid as applied to national
banks a California statute which required "escheat to the state"
of all balances in deposit accounts remaining unclaimed and
inactive for more than twenty years, where neither the depositor
nor any claimant had filed any notice with the bank showing
his present address. Proof that the dormant accounts were in
fact abandoned was not required. The accounts were declared
escheated upon mere proof of dormancy for the prescribed period
with no opportunity to claim the deposit. The decision there
rested not upon the state's power to enact and enforce a dis-
position of dormant accounts in a national bank, but rather
upon the failure of adequate procedural due process. The Court
described the confiscatory effects of the California statute as
being so "unusual and so harsh in its application to depositors
as to deter them from placing or keeping their funds in national
banks. ',
The San Jose case, however, was held to be inconclusive
where only custody (not title) of the depositor's account is
transferred to the state along with absolute assumption of the
bank's obligation to the depositor. 6 Neither is the case con-
elusive where bank deposits without an owner or in fact aban-
doned are taken as escheats.67 The decision in the San Jose case
turned on the effect of the procedure followed in the California
statute rather than the power of a state to demand of a national
Bank, payment of deposits which the state was lawfully entitled
to receive. The effects of the protective custody statute are dis-
ting-uishable from the circumstances found in the San Jose case.
Instead of "confiscating" deposits in national banks on mere
proof of dormancy as found there, the deposits under the aban-
doned property acts are conserved forever for the benefit of the
depositor unless there is a final escheat predicated upon the
additional essential action of a judicial finding of abandonment
262 U.S. 366, 67 L. ed. 1030 (1922).
321 U.S. 233, at 250.
Ibid., at 252.
"In Territory of Alaska v. First National Bank of Fairbanks,
22 F. (2d) 377 (1927), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
deposits in national banks could be escheated upon death intestate
without heirs. Also see United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276, 82
L. ed. 840 (1938) wherein escheats were held to be no interference
with a federal instrumentality.
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in fact. Statutes which apply the doctrine of escheat to national
banks need not interfere with the operation of national banks
provided due process is afforded therein.
III
REVENUE ASPECTS
The real motives which lie behind the doctrine of eseheats
as it exists today and abandoned property acts are not neces-
sarily fiscal, but protective and conservative. Public policy
and the general interest of society require that property shall
not remain abandoned until destroyed from depletion and de-
preciation. In this respect the doctrine of escheats, except for
the forfeiture aspects, is but an integral and indispensable part
of the laws of distribution and descent. The laws governing
descent would be faulty and incomplete without provisions for
disposition of property when the owner dies leaving no known
legal heirs and no will or when the owner is missing or has
abandoned his property under circumstances which give rise
to a legal presumption of death. The abandoned property acts
are supplementary phases of escheats in that they permit prop-
erty lying dormant to be taken and conserved for possible escheat
later. The latter also have the distinctive effect of providing
a. simple, inexpensive method of conserving property for the
owner, should he later appear, as well as protecting it from dis-
sipation before actual escheat.
Escheats afforded a valuable source of revenue during the
Middle Ages.68 Even in the early. proprietary colonies eseheats
provided considerable profit. 69 However, public revenues from
escheats, unlike revenues from such taxes as those on income and
sales, which have mounted steadily year by year since their
inauguration, have declined in fiscal importance. Compared
either to total tax revenues or other non-tax receipts such as
commercial income and fines, revenues from escheats are
trivial.70 States derive but one to three million in revenue from
' Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Escheats, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. III, p. 591.
Hardman, Law of Escheats, 4 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 318, 325.
U.S. Bureau of Census, State Finances: 1944, (Individual state
reports) Vol. I, Nos. 1-48.
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escheats71 City governments and local districts derive a small
income from eseheats and in some instances from abandoned
property acts, while the Federal government receives none.
The meagerness in the fiscal productivity of escheats may
be attributed to the purposes for which the doctrine exists. The
fiscal effects of escheats have been narrowed away by the wider
powers of testation which have almost completely nullified legal
opportunities for escheats to operate. Few wealthy individuals
as a practical matter die without known heirs. The slight fiscal
importance of escheats today is but a byproduct of its larger ob-
jective. Even if fiscally significant, the wide fluctuation in
volume of revenue receipts from either escheats or abandoned
property acts would present complicated budgetary difficulties.
Statutes providing for transfer of custody of dormant prop-
erty to the state in some instances have proved to be a source
of considerable non-tax revenues. Although such funds are
generally held under a plan much like a trustee relationship in
many respects, yet the funds are paid into the regular revenue
fund and spent. The claimant must then look either to current
collections'for reimbursement or to a legislative appropriation.
Whether the state pays interest on the refund is a matter of
legislative policy.7 2 Heavy receipts during the first year of
operation of abandoned property acts which are fairly compre-
hensive are generally the rule. However, receipts from aban-
doned property acts, like escheats, are always unpredictable and
erratic. Increased demands for refunds on prior year collections
may all but wipe out current collections. Due to the added factor
of refunds the state officials never know exactly how they stand
from a revenue standpoint.
Receipts from the New York and Kentucky abandoned
property acts, which are most comprehensive, reflect the revenue
possibilities in such statutes. The Kentucky and New York
acts both became effective in 1944. More than $21.5 million in
unclaimed assets had been transferred to state possession in New
York by Mlarch 31, 1945. This sum included approximately
$10.5 million recovered in unclaimed bank deposits and funds
I Public Administration Clearing House, op. cit. Also cf. U.S.
Bureau of Census, ibid. and WILLIAM J. SHurLTz, AMERICAN PUBLIC
FINANCE (3d ed., 1942) 594, 625, who estimates annual state receipts
from escheats as one to two million.
' Moufang v. State, 295 N.Y. 121, 65 N.E. (2d) 65 (1946).
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held for payment of certified checks or negotiable instruments.
As~of March 31, 1946 New York had assumed liability for $5.9
million in unclaimed utility service charges and rebates and
$2.4 million in funds paid into court. Another million dollars
was recovered in unclaimed awards for property taken by
eminent domain and a half million dollars in matured endow-
ments, death claims, and paid-up insurance.
7 3
Receipts from the Kentucky abandoned property act are
far less impressive when compared to those in the populous state
of New York. Aside from economic and slight statutory dis-
similarities, this difference in revenue is particularly due to the
return in Kentucky of a large amount of dormant property to
the owners immediately before the reports were due as a result
of the widespread publicity given the act while pending in the
legislature and courts. The diligent efforts on the part of banks
to return the funds before reporting them, the prevalence of
"ferrets" who located owners for a share of their return, and
the publication of the list of funds were factors in bringing the
funds to the owners. However, during the fiscal year 1944-45
unclaimed funds aggregating $441,893 were reported in Ken-
tucky.74 This sum for the most part represented bank deposits
and utility service deposits. No dividends, wages, or unclaimed
pari-mutuel winnings 5 are reflected in the sum reported to the
Commonwealth. Approximately 25 per cent of the total funds
'Letter from Hon. Frank C. Moore, State Comptroller, April 23,
1946.
,' This does not take into account escheat of certain unclaimed
utility service deposits by the municipalities and certain un-
liquidated securities held by the state.
I In at least five states, California, New Jersey, New York, New
Hampshire, and West Virginia, special statutory provisions require
sums unclaimed by holders of winning tickets to be paid directly
to the state treasury. These special provisions contained in the acts
governing racing have the characteristics of abandoned property
acts covering other types of property. In addition Illinois has ear-
marked these funds to a special Veterans Rehabilitation Fund from
which a veteran's hospital has been erected. Uncashed mutuels in
New YOrk alone, where such funds are required to be turned over
to the state on the following April 1, amounted to more than $200,000
in 1945. Although the Kentucky abandoned property act appears
to require reporting of unclaimed mutuel winnings, no attempt has
been made to obtain reports on such funds. See Ray H. Garrison,
Taxation of Horse Racing, Federation of Tax Administrators, Re-
search Report No. 17, 1946, p. 9 for a discussion of the opportunities
in revenue from unclaimed pari-mutuel winnings under abandoned
property acts.
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reported were refunded to the owners who were located either
by the reporter after making the report or refunded by the
state. 6 Although the Kentucky act permits the state to acquire
title to the remainder through appropriate procedure, the policy
has been not to outright escheat such funds. From first year
operations Kentucky retained $337,530.72 which belongs to ap-
proximately 50,000 persons who either have not been located or
who have considered the amount too small to make a claim.
77
Missouri in 1944 recovered almost a quarter of a million
dollars which was unclaimed76 Approximately $250,000 in un-
claimed bank deposits were reported to the Secretary of State
in Minnesota during 1943. The Attorney General is presently
engaged in bringing actions to acquire title to these accounts.7 9
Collections for 1945 in other states in which data have been re-
ported were as follows: California, $201,000; Connecticut,
$21,000; and Pennsylvania, $319,000.80
Although the taking of custody of various types of unclaim-
ed property provides considerable more revenue than taking by
outright escheat, the benefits such legislation provides for the
owner must take precedence over any revenue possibilities to the
state. However, the relatively simple and expedient procedure
by which the custody of such property is taken permits the state
to obtain many small balances which otherwise would pass to
someone other than the owner. These small balances are not
worth the expense of procedure required for escheat. In the
aggregate, however, state governments find them financially
worth the expense and time of procuring.
"Kentucky Department of Revenue, Twenty-Seventh Annual
Report, 1945, p. 19.
7 Ibid.
" Letter from Forrest Smith, State Auditor, April 26, 1946.
,'Letter from George G. Edgerton, Special Assistant Attorney
General, April 30, 1946.
"U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit.
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